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DH Brothers Industries (PTY) Limited vs. Olivine Industries (PTY) 
Limited (Appeal No. 74/2010) [2012] ZMSC 17 
Chanda N. Tembo 
 
The Facts 
The Respondent, Olivine Industries, applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks 
(The “Registrar”) for the registration of the mark ‘Daily’ under Class 3 of 
the Trade Marks Act.1 The registration was with respect to “its bleaching 
preparations and other substances for laundry use such as cleaning, 
polishing and abrasive preparations, soaps, perfumery, essential oils, 
cosmetics, hair lotion and dentifrices.”2 The Appellant, DH Brothers, 
opposed the Respondent’s application on the grounds that the Appellant was 
the true proprietor of the mark “Daily”. The Appellant also advanced the 
“prior use” argument, noting that it had been using the unregistered mark 
since 2003. Deciding in favour of the Respondent, the Registrar allowed the 
registration of the mark on the ground that the Appellant’s mark was not 
registered under the Act, and was therefore not entitled to protection under 
the Act. This was notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant demonstrated 
prior use of the mark ‘Daily’ for a similar class of goods.  
 
Aggrieved by this decision, The Appellant appealed to the High Court. The 
High Court upheld the Registrar’s decision. The Appellant then appealed to 
the Supreme Court. 
 
The Holding  
The crux of the Registrar’s decision, as upheld by the High Court and by the 
Supreme Court, was that the Act does not offer protection to unregistered 
marks, and that consequently, the proprietor of an unregistered mark cannot 
prevent the registration of a similar or identical mark under the Trade Mark 
Act. An aggrieved proprietor of an unregistered mark can therefore not 
invoke Sections 16 and 17 of the Act.3 Section 16 pertains to the prohibition  
                                                
1  Cap 401 of the Laws of Zambia (The “Act”). 
2  Class 3, Classification of Goods, The Fourth Schedule to the Act 
3  In this case the Supreme Court refused to accept the argument made by the 
Appellant that relied on an English case, The Trade Marks Act, 1938 and Koyo 
Seiko Kabushiki Kaisha’s in the Reports of Patent, Design and Trade Mark 
Cases, vol. LXX1 No.19, London, 1954. In that case, it was held that a 
corresponding Section 11 of the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act (which was 
transplanted into the Zambia Trade Mark Act unchanged as Section 16) was 
available to proprietors of an unregistered mark, while section 12 under the 1938 
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of the registration of marks that are likely to deceive or confuse consumers 
or the general public in the course of trade,4 while Section 17 provides for 
the prohibition of the registration of marks with respect to any goods or the 
description of goods that are identical or closely resemble a mark already 
registered under the Act.5 
 
Of central concern in this commentary is Section 7 of the Act, the section on 
which the courts based their decision. Section 7 provides that “no person 
shall be entitled to institute any proceedings to prevent or to recover 
damages for the infringement of an unregistered trade mark, but nothing in 
this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for 
passing off goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect 
thereof.”6  
 
Significance: Key Unresolved Questions  
Marks Capable of Registration 
In considering the question of which marks are eligible for registration 
under the Act, the Supreme Court should have drawn its mind to the 
question of whether the mark “Daily”, a common English word of keen use, 
was registrable under the Act. Before delving into a more detailed 
consideration of this issue, it is important to consider what a mark is.7 The 
                                                                                                    
Act (which corresponds with Section 17 of the Zambian Act) was only available 
to proprietors of registered marks. The Supreme Court in the case in casu on the 
contrary held the view that the whole Act was not available or applicable, unless 
as expressly provided, to unregistered marks. It must be noted that the Trade 
Mark Act of the United Kingdom of 1938 (available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1938/22/pdfs/ukpga_19380022_en.pdf) 
was repealed and replaced in 1994 by the British Trade Marks Act of 1994 
(available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=127270).  
4  Section 16, of the Act; this is because trade marks as economic tools are 
conveyors of economic information regarding the quality or other attributes of 
goods or services being sold so as to facilitate purchase decisions in the course 
of trade. See B. G. Ramello, (2006) ‘What is in a Sign? Trademark Law and 
Economic Theory?’Journal of Economic Surveys 20, 4, 547-565, 549; Deceiving 
or confusing consumers in the course of trade are therefore likely to prejudice 
the economic interests of the proprietor of the legitimate and registered mark. 
5  Ibid, Section 17 
6  Section 7, of the Act; See also Section 2(1) of the UK Trade Mark Act of 1994 
and Section 27(1) and (2) of the Indian Trade Mark Act of 1999 
7  A trade mark is defined as a mark, “except in relation to certification marks, 
which is used or proposed to be used in relation to goods for purposes of 
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Act establishes a Register of trade marks which is divided into four parts: 
Part A, Part B, Part C and Part D.8 A mark is capable of registration under 
any of these parts if it has some element of distinctiveness. In the context of 
trade mark law, ‘distinctiveness’ is the ability to distinguish and 
differentiate the goods and services of one business from competing 
businesses.9 
 
The degrees of distinctiveness varies between the four parts, particularly 
between Part A and Part B. Section 15 of the Act requires that marks 
registerable under Part B of the Trademark Register: 
 
must be capable, in relation to the goods in respect of which it is 
registered or proposed to be registered, of distinguishing goods 
with which the proprietor of the trade mark is or may be connected 
in the course of trade, from goods in the case of which no such 
connection subsists, either generally or, where the trade mark is 
registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in 
relation to use within the extent of the registration.10  
 
This means that a mark’s ability to distinguish can increase with use over 
time. However, for trademarks registerable under Part A of the Act, the 
ability to distinguish is higher, because the Act requires that these marks 
must be inherently distinct or inherently capable of distinguishing goods of 
competing businesses. This means that the mark ‘Daily’, unless modified 
through fancy representation for instance, would not qualify for registration 
under Part A of the Register. It follows however that the mark ‘Daily,’ 
                                                                                                    
indicating for, or so as to indicate, a connection in the course of trade between 
the goods and some person having the right either as proprietor or as a 
registered user to use the mark, whether with or without any indication of the 
identity of the person.” (Section 2 of the Act); marks which are defined as 
including a “device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, 
numerical or a combination thereof.” (Section 2 of the Act) 
8  Ibid, Section 6(2) 
9  A. Taubman, et al., (2012) A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement. 
Cambridge University Press, 57; Section 14(2) of the Act states that a trade mark 
is said to be distinctive if it is “adapted in relation to goods in respect of which a 
trademark is registered or proposed to be registered, to distinguish goods with 
which the proprietor of the trademark is or may be connected in the course of 
trade …”  
10  Ibid, Section, 15 
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being less distinctive, would most likely be eligible for registration under 
Part B of the Register.  
 
The Availability for Registration of Common Words under the Trademarks 
Act 
One of the key functions of a trademark is to minimise the cost of 
information in the course of trade.11 By branding goods and services, 
trademarks act as communication tools. Common nouns and adjectives are 
generally said to be ‘inappropriable’ through trademark and therefore 
available for all businesses to use in the course of trade. If common words 
were permitted to be monopolised through appropriation in the course of 
trade, this would increase the cost of information for other businesses, who 
must in turn find alternative expressions through words or signs to identify 
goods and services. In the course of its decision, the Court should have 
applied its mind to the question of whether “Daily” was a common word, 
and if so, whether it was capable of registration.  
 
Common words in trademark law are also known as generic words or 
marks. Something is said to be generic or common if it is “shared by, 
including or typical of a group of people.”12 Common words are therefore 
unavailable for monopolisation since the words are available for all to use. 
From a legal standpoint, no one person or business has the right to 
appropriate a common or generic word and stop others from using that word 
in the course and scope of their business. The law however, does provide an 
exception. If a party wishes to register a common or generic mark, the 
Registrar will require the proprietor of the mark to enter a disclaimer 
notifying the public that the proprietor is aware that the proprietor has no 
exclusive right or monopoly over the common word, and thus has no right 
to restrict or prevent others in Zambia from utilising the generic word.13 In 
Zambia a good example of disclaimers applied to common words would 
relate to the common word ‘Manzi’ in the trade mark ‘ManziValley’ owned 
by Natural Valley Limited. ‘Manzi’ in some local Zambian languages 
literally means water. ‘Water’ or ‘Manzi’ are both common words that, 
unless adapted for instance through fanciful writing, are not available for 
absolute appropriation or monopolisation through trademarks.  
                                                
11  Ramello B.G. (2006) ‘What is in a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic 
Theory.’ Journal of Economic Surveys 20, 4, 547-565; 552 
12  Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary. (2006) 620 
13  See Sections 19, 36, and 39(1)(e) of the Act 
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Should Passing Off be Pleaded Specifically in an Opposition Action? 
This case raised both substantive and procedural issues. Substantively, 
while the proper court of first instance was indeed the High Court, the 
action brought by the Appellant was defective because as stated above, 
Section 7 of the Act bars any action brought under the Act that relates to an 
unregistered mark. From a procedural perspective, the initial action was 
defective because the action was improperly brought before the courts. This 
is because passing off has to be pleaded as a common law tort and not under 
the Trade Marks Act.  
 
In addition, there is unanimous precedent that states that where 
commencement of a civil matter is prescribed by law, commencement of 
proceedings must conform to the prescribing law.14 Thus, where a litigant 
departs from the prescription of law with regard to the mode of 
commencing an action, such commencement must be treated as defective. 
This means that passing off has to be specifically pleaded as a common law 
tort under a separate action against the infringing party in accordance with 




All in all, the Court’s decision might have been a more effective 




                                                
14 Newplast Industries V the Commissioner of Lands and the Attorney General. 
 
